top of page
1310510_edited.jpg
KAHNTENTIONS

KAHNTENTIONS is a blog post written by Gilbert N. Kahn, Professor of Political Science at Kean University in Union, New Jersey. Beginning in 2011 KAHNTENTIONS was hosted by the New Jersey Jewish News which recently ceased written publication. KAHNTENTIONS presents an open and intellectually honest analysis of issues facing the United States, Israel, as well as Jews world-wide.

BY GILBERT N. KAHN

"These are the times that try men's souls."

Search
Writer's picturegilbertkahn

Beginning the Afghanistan Post-Mortem


In 1972, ten years following the Cuban Missile Crisis, Irving Janis, a research psychologist at Yale, published the results of his groundbreaking study on what the sociologist/psychologist William H. Whyte in 1952 had termed “group-think”. Applying it to politics, Janis examined Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Since that time, Janis’ model has been used by scholars for decades as a critical prism within which to understand decision-making; the extent to which participants in the decision-making process separate themselves from an inclination to please, conform, or agree with the decision-maker rather than try to achieve effective decisions.


In political as well as corporate settings Janis’ theory is recognized as a critical lens to appreciate how decision-makers arrive at a decision. Presidential decision-making at the highest and most crucial level has almost always been affected by a degree of “group-think” held by some of the participants. In deciding how to proceed with U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan it is likely that some of President Biden’s key advisers may well have been trapped by the theory of “group-think” to the detriment of the optimal decision-making process and the best interests of the United States.


The Administration and the Congress will undoubtedly investigate and evaluate why the Biden Administration’s decision to withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan went so wrong, so fast. It has already become clear that both the intelligence community and the military were either grossly optimistic or failed to argue with sufficient cogency what their data and operatives were reporting on the ground.


Placing political blame is very easy and totally unproductive. The failures in the decision-making process in the Biden White House transcend all the political blame-game that is still dominating the news. The abrupt drop in the President’s approval ratings was to be expected, but in all likelihood they will gradually bounce back.


Considerable harm, however, has been done to the U.S. position throughout the world although President Biden’s clear acceptance of responsibility does improve the likelihood that he should be able to repair the damage in relatively short-order. America’s friends and adversaries will watch as the President approaches them as well as how he addresses his next crisis.


In the public realm, President Biden will have several opportunities to reframe the U.S. Government’s role in the world. He will undoubtedly engage in the 20th memorial commemoration of the 9/11 attack before the nation (and the world) as one such opportunity. During the annual meeting of the U.N. General Assembly in September, Biden also will have an additional opportunity to re-articulate his Administration’s global directions and priorities.


From an analyst’s perspective the major questions surrounding the decision is why did the lessons-- which previous decision-making crises should have taught President Biden and his national security team--not click in? As was the case with President Kennedy in 1961 in the Bay of Pigs fiasco, this also was a new Administration’s first major international crisis. The intelligence community in particular was still adjusting, after dealing for four years with the Trump White House. Intel experts were now presuming that they had a group of decision-makers who respected intelligence. There was something wrong if they concluded that Biden’s team did not want the truth and the facts.


The military misread the rapidity with which the Afghani security forces disbanded and abandoned their mission. There was a failure to make the argument that the planned accelerated U.S. withdrawal would not work. No one sought to put the brakes on the immediate U.S. departure. Even if the military was recommending that the President would have to eat his words, it always could have spun their version of the story after the fact. In addition, did Biden face political and legislative advisers who enjoined the debate concerned as to how this debacle could undermine the legislative battles in which the Administration is currently engaged?


At the end of the day, once again Janis returns to haunt decision-makers. They do not want to learn the lesson that their egos or hubris will not teach them. It will be very interesting to observe how the President emerges from this crisis. It is critical to watch whether the national security operation in the Biden Administration can emerge more effective and efficient in the future.

46 views0 comments

Recent Posts

See All

Campaign ‘24

There is something boring yet scary about the 2024 election season, certainly at the presidential level. The presidential contest has...

Comments


bottom of page