President Biden’s trip to Israel sharpened even more in the eyes of the world the seriousness with which the U.S. Government takes its relationship with Israel as well as his determination to control any possible escalation of the confrontation in Gaza. Whether his efforts will succeed are not at all clear but his public demonstration in Israel was clearly both substantive and emotional.
From both a strategic as well as a tactical perspective there is something very troubling about what exactly is transpiring along the Israeli border with Gaza. It is now almost two weeks since Hamas invaded Israel and slaughtered 1400 Israelis and captured at least 203 hostages. Israel’s full military mobilization occurred within the next 72 hours. Since then, as the Israeli infantry and armored units have been assembling and preparing for a likely invasion of the Gaza Strip, except for the Israeli Air Force (IAF), there has been no visible movements of forces yet.
This situation presents two major problems. Israel recognizes that you cannot keep a force of over 300,000 combat ready soldiers standing by indefinitely. In fact, the capacity for even the most motivated and well-trained forces to keep their readiness sharp declines after remaining primed for several days. If Israel does not move ahead into Gaza soon, it will create even greater problems for the cohesion of its military units.
There is a question about why this delay, part of which was natural, might be occurring also is troubling. It could well be because Israel—and especially many of the infantry and armored units—has never “gamed” the very scenario in which the IDF now finds itself, attacking Gaza when the lives of several hundred hostages are at stake. Israel may not have planned for this type of confrontation. Even worse, if Israeli intelligence was so unprepared on its own side of the border that Hamas was able to cross it on October 7 with so much afore knowledge, has the Israeli intelligence in Gaza—involving bunkers, tunnels, and traps—also not been updated?
Unfortunately, this delay, some of which was a U.S. urged stall was intensified by the visits of the German Chancellor, the American President, and the British Prime Minister. In addition, there was the unspoken, recommendation of President Biden for Israel to restrain itself from entering Gaza. This needed to be carefully weighed, if for no other reason than out of respect for the demonstrative, extensive support being rendered to Israel by the U.S.
This postponement also reduced Israel’s victimhood edge which had energized the initial world-wide reaction. The extensive shock over the explosion at the Gaza hospital, which the world received as being erroneously attributed to Israel, removed any such edge which Israel might have enjoyed during the earlier days of the war.
(It is impossible to adequately assess the consequences of the immediate, uncorroborated, and irresponsible media reporting of the explosion. Demonstrations and rioting occurred based on this totally fallacious presentation by some of the most widely recognized world-wide media, including the New York Times and the BBC. It exemplifies the danger, the damage, and the human harm created by such irresponsible journalism. The fact that none of these news operations to date have issued even a qualified apology is an arrogance of power—if not worse.)
Postponing a ground war allowed for negotiations for the possible release of the hostages to be pursued more intensively, hopefully avoiding more casualties, and not in the midst of a land war. If President Biden’s goal to free the hostages was paramount for the U.S.—as it is for Israel as well—then setting up a negotiating track is easier than in the midst of active combat. It also, kept Hamas aware that if played well it might emerge with at least some assets.
There remain additional vital questions which are critical, especially for the U.S. Can this conflict be contained? Is a challenge to Israel immediately forthcoming from Hezbollah in Lebanon and in Syria? If Israel invades Gaza will Hezbollah launch a major attack on Israel with weapons systems which are believed to be far more accurate than Hamas’? How far is Iran prepared to go to challenge Israel and the West in a possible military confrontation? What might it take for the U.S. to get actively involved in a war with Iran or its surrogates?
In addition, for Israel, what precisely is Israel’s endgame strategy, assuming it degrades and/or eliminates the functional power of Hamas? Is there a reasonable scenario for the administration of the Gaza Strip following a war or does Israel’s withdrawal merely prepare Gazans for the next round? Can this war’s conclusion represent the beginning of a constructive process for ultimate reconciliation and mutual recognition? Would the next round of Arab leaders in Gaza be prepared to repudiate the Hamas Charter?
Underlying the exceedingly heartfelt visit which the President made on Wednesday to Israel as well his remarks in Tel Aviv and from the White House, Biden clearly sought to signal a desire to contain the Gaza conflict. If he fails to accomplish this or to minimize its spread, there are much more dangerous directions into which this region could escalate.
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