The obituaries and memorials that poured in following the passing of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger were fascinating. Articles have appeared in every media source in the United States and around the world seeking to capture the huge impact that Kissinger had on U.S. foreign policy and national security policy in the second half of the 20th Century. Both his academic work as well as his diplomatic service, both the credits and the defaults, have been dissected in detail.
What is most important for contemporary activists and diplomats is to appreciate Kissinger’s innovative style which he brought to his portfolio. They included first and foremost an awareness of cultural sensitivities. Second, the fact that to be successful in modern diplomacy many nations need to have a sense of physical personal engagement. Third, he believed that a national security advisor and a secretary of state must endeavor—as much as possible--to stay out of domestic politics.
In the Middle East, Secretary Kissinger introduced a brand-new dimension of his own personal diplomatic style. He comprehended that especially in the Middle East personal diplomacy was crucial. Kissinger created the notion of “shuttle diplomacy” which has since become the bedrock of how America today conducts global political negotiations--especially in the Middle East.
No American statesman is likely to exceed Dr. Kissinger’s exhaustive style of diplomatic negotiations. While they may surpass the number of hours he logged flying, no one will match his intensity. Unlike any other American diplomat before him, Secretary Kissinger recognized that when you are negotiating in the Middle East, especially in the Arab world, the formal niceties are critical. Drinking cups of coffee and sipping glasses of tea served by major Middle Eastern leaders are an integral part of negotiations. Even the style and speed with which one imbibes the liquid is part of the negotiating process. Kissinger was a master at playing this dance with Arab leaders. It needs to be appreciated that his sensitivity to these nuances, helps to explain how a Jewish Secretary of State succeeded in obtaining the results he was seeking; but often, as is the Arabic style, never quickly, immediately, or without bumps in the road.
There was another aspect to Middle East negotiations which Henry Kissinger instructed American diplomats. He quickly accepted the pattern that Arab leaders often do some of their most serious negotiating around midnight and into the wee hours of the morning. As irritating as that was and still is, Kissinger understood that when you negotiate with Arab leaders, in order to achieve positive results, you are required to “play the game” according to “house” rules.
(Scholars and diplomats have observed that all cultures have their rules of engagement. This is especially true in the conduct of diplomacy in Asia. It is worth noting, however, that, today, many Chinese diplomats, for example, already have adopted many of the American or Western models of diplomacy.)
Finally, and by no means least, Henry Kissinger, unlike almost any other Secretary of State or presidential National Security Advisor, was committed to staying above or out of the domestic political conversation. In both of his positions, he succeeded in appearing never to be engaging in the domestic politics of the White House. For Presidents Nixon and Ford, Kissinger was their big academic gun and their foreign policy guru, not someone measuring the political liability of a policy initiative. For Kissinger, clearly opening up the door to China had intrinsic merit for the U.S. in Asia. Changing U.S, policy and convincing President Nixon that this was a smart policy shift on its merits was Kissinger’s goal. It was not a cost-benefit analysis of the political consequences for President Nixon, the Republican Party, or his re-election.
In seeking to resolve the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the ensuing lengthy peace negotiations, Kissinger never appeared to be engaged in the on-going Watergate scandal engulfing the Nixon White House. Kissinger did his work, obtained presidential signoffs, and everyone followed his tune. He adopted a similar pattern with respect to the Soviet Union, China, and the Viet-Nam peace talks. Even President Nixon’s farewell global tour in June 1974, before he was forced to resign, had diplomatic value for Kissinger to set world leaders at ease about a future transition in Washington.
Henry Kissinger was not beloved by all and many of his policy directions and choices continue to be challenged. He was, however, a formidable personality on the world stage not only during his period of active public service, but in his academic contributions before as well as his consultative and public intellectual role following his official role in Washington.
Comments